University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

1998

Damaška:
Dama ka: Evidence Law Adrift. A Book Review
Richard O. Lempert

University of Michigan Law School, rlempert@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/187

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Lempert, Richard O. "Damaška: Evidence Law Adrift. A Book Review." Review of Evidence Law Adrift,
Hastings Law Journal 49, no. 2 (1998): 397-401.

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Damaska: Evidence Lnw Adrift
A Book Review
by
RICHARD

0. LEMPERT*

Let me state my biases at the start. I am a great fan of Professor
Damaska and have been e:ver since I read his first book, The Faces of
Justice and State Authority. Professor Damaska's most recent book,
Evidence Law Adrift, adds to my admiration. In Evidence Law Adrift
Professor Damaska examines Continental and Anglo-American trial
procedures and argues that changes in the way Anglo-American
courts resolve cases, especially the marginalization of the jury trial,
strip common law evidence doctrine of its theoretical base and place
it in danger of becoming an intellectual curiosity confined, in Professor Damaska's words, "to an oubliette in the castle of justice." 1 One
does not have to agree with all of Professor Damaska's analysis to
share his sense that the classic common law trial and the rules and
procedures integral to it are at a point of crisis.
Professor Damaska thinks naturally in terms of institutional interconnectedness. Evidence Law Adrift draws strength from Professor Damaska's sensitivity to how institutions articulate with their societies and cultures, from his concern for the limitations and capacity
of institutions and groups, and from his awareness of the constraints
imposed by history, in the sense of path dependence (my term, not
his). These elements are, as Professor Damaska demonstrates, essential in understanding the situation of evidence systems today, the
strains they face and their likely futures. The book is further
strengthened by the ease with which Professor Damaska moves back
and forth between Continental and Anglo-American systems of evidence law, allowing him to use each to illuminate the other.
I must also say a word about the writing. By appearance Evidence Law Adrift is a thin book-it is only 152 pages long. Its brevity
is, however, deceiving. The book is dense with ideas; there is not a
wasted sentence and hardly a wasted word. Yet it is not densely written; rather it is a book which can give native English speakers lessons
in style. For example, Professor Damaska argues that three features
have shaped the Anglo-American system of evidence law: lay decision makers Gurors), concentrated trials, and the adversary system.
* Frances A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of Sociology, & Chair,
Department of Sociology, The University of Michigan.
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In discussing the adversary system and how it affects the appearance
of the conflicts courts must resolve, he writes: "Thus, as in a car
driving at night, two narrow beams continue to illuminate the world
presented to the adjudicator from the beginning until the end of
trial. " 2 This metaphor is so good that Professor Damaska later returns to it, but who can blame him?
Book reviews should not be all praise, yet I have no quarrel with
the quality of Professor Damaska's argument or with his book's basic
thesis. I do, however, believe that at least one issue deserves more
attention than Professor Damaska gives it. In explaining the characteristics of the Anglo-American and Continental systems and the
evidentiary approaches they give rise to, Professor Damaska just
hints, in a footnote here and a few lines there, at issues of power, and
the word itself is not listed in his index. Greater attention to issues of
power would have enhanced the book's discussion of the development of rules of evidence in the context of lay juries and its discussion of the adversary system.
With respect to the development of the rules of evidence, it is
obvious that evidence rules give trial courts power over juries; less
obvious but, I would posit, more important to their development is
that they give appellate courts power over trial courts. The common
law rules of evidence emerged in appellate court decisions as devices
to exercise, in the context of specific cases, control over both trial
courts and juries below them. One wonders, for example, whether
the court that, in the context of Wright v. Doe de Tatham, 3 found nonassertive conduct to be hearsay, later had occasion to regret that decision because of the complexities it imposed, but was nonetheless
comforted by the fact that its decision prevented Wright, who may
well have appeared to the appellate judges as an overreaching steward, from being elevated to the control of a gentleman's vast estate.
Similarly, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,4 the Supreme Court's
decision prevented the judicial system's complicity in the success of a
scheme that, no doubt, appeared to the Justices as a fraud with murder at its core. Attention to relations of power between higher and
lower courts suggests that in addition to the reasons Professor
Damaska provides, another possible reason why rules of evidence did
not emerge to nearly the same degree on the Continent as they did in
England and America was because Continental trial judges had to
explain their decisions in writing. These explanations may have given
higher courts the purchase they needed when, for whatever reason.
they wished to reverse decisions below. If this speculation is correct.
2.

Id at 92.

3.
4.

112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
145 U.S 285,295 (1892).
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lay juries may have been crucial to the emergence of rules of evidence not so much because they needed to be controlled, but because
the absence of rules of evidence would have allowed the jury to more
effectively insulate trial court verdicts from the control of nominally
more powerful, and politically more central, appellate courts.
More explicit attention to power might also have enhanced Professor Damaska's discussion of the rise of the adversary system. The
adversary system with lay fact finders tends to limit state power both
because of the possibility of jury nullification and because legal adversaries are formally equal in the trial context. This system may
have arisen in Britain and taken even firmer hold in the United
States in part because these two societies were particularly suspicious
of absolute, centralized power. I wish, for example, that Professor
Damaska had told us whether we find in any Continental system
cases equivalent to Bushell's Case5 in 17th century England or the
John Peter Zenger6 trial in the 18th century United States. While the
image of the Continental system that emerges in Professor
Damaska's chapter on the adversary system is that of the neutral
judge ferreting out the truth in criminal cases, it seems difficult on
formal or institutional grounds to distinguish this judge from the Nazi
judge hearing cases involving Jewish property or the Soviet judge
hearing cases of crimes against the people. The Continental system,
in other words, seems to institutionalize a judicial role that allows the
easy extension of the state's repressive power. By contrast, as repressive as the South African regime was under apartheid, the institutionalization there of an adversary system and a model of passive
judging seems to have made it more difficult for a tyrannical regime
to achieve hegemony.7
Professor Damaska makes the point that in the United States
jury trials as a proportion of all trials are diminishing, and that in
England civil jury trials have largely disappeared. He suggests that
system deficiencies regarding fact-finding and dispute resolution have
been doing in the jury system and by extension the rules of evidence.
As jury trials and the rules of evidence grow more complex, the system of adversary trials to lay decision makers and the associated rules
of evidence collapses under its own weight. This analysis may be correct; it is consistent with both popular critiques of jury verdicts and
complaints about the jury system that certain repeat litigants (e.g. insurance companies) register. Yet other possibilities deserve attention.
5. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
6. See ALEXANDER, THE TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (1963).
1. See generally, RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 1980-1994 (1995).
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The demise of the civil jury in England seems to have begun not
because of complaints about the jury system, but because in World
War I there was a shortage of men available for jury duty. (Japan,
ostensibly for the same reason, suspended its jury system during
World War II, but the jury trial seems to have been abandoned in Japan before it was formally suspended.) In the United States, while
the percentage of cases going to jury trial may be diminishing, the absolute number of jury trials remains substantial and may be rising.
The institution of the jury trial may be diminishing not because of
popular or litigant dissatisfaction with jury trials, but because the nation's willingness to supply jury trials, as evidenced both by the resources allocated to them and official pressures on litigants to avoid
jury trials, may not be keeping up with demand. If so, there is no
necessary relationship between the diminishing role of the jury trial
in resolving cases and general dissatisfaction with the jury system.
Another possibility is that in a world of finite governmental resources, the demand for governmental services other than jury trials
(e.g. health care) has risen relatively more than the demand for jury
trials. Moreover, state actors who control the government's purse
strings may be biased against investing in jury trials because the institution tends to limit governmental power. For similar self-interested
reasons, powerful elements in society, like insurance companies, may
fund efforts to portray the jury system as collapsing under its own
weight and the trial jury as incompetent. Until possibilities like these
are disposed of, one cannot be sure that statistics suggesting that juries are increasingly marginal to legal dispute settlement reflect
problems internal to the jury system, to adversary trials, and to the
constraints imposed by rules of evidence.
At another point in his book, Professor Damaska contrasts the
Continental judge relentlessly searching for truth with the adversaries
in United States criminal trials who want only for their side to win.
The contrast misses the point that ideologically the prosecutor is like
the investigative judge; although she has an adversary role at triaL
her ultimate concern is supposedly to see that justice is done. An adversary trial is justified only because, by the time the case comes to
trial, the prosecutor has supposedly determined in her role as a neutral investigator that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. As
a behavioral matter, however, the contrast Professor Damaska draws
appears genuine. Prosecutors in the United States have long seemed
to find the pull of adversariness easier to comply with than any neutral obligation to do justice. They are not reluctant to take advantage
of whatever emotion might lead jurors to find for the state regardless
of its tendency to undermine rational fact-finding, and nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence and the suborning of perjury, especially po-
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lice perjury about search and seizure issues, are familiar behaviors.
Recently, the actual adversariness of prosecutors has become more
salient as several prosecutors-most notably Marcia Clark, who
prosecuted O.J. Simpson-have expressed their disappointment in
jury verdicts and even criticized juries that have not returned the
verdicts they sought. The open issue here is whether Continental
judges are any less identified with the state's interest in conviction
than U.S. prosecutors. Although their role does not require them to
take an adversarial stance-indeed, it requires neutrality-their position may generate biases in favor of conviction similar to those of
United States prosecutors. In Japan, for example, those academics
and lawyers who are pushing for the reinstatement of jury trials are
spurred by bench trial conviction rates exceeding 99%.
Finally, Professor Damaska suggests that interval trials present
more evidence than adversary trials. I wonder. Where trials proceed
at intervals, they tend to combine functions that in an adversary system may be separated into discovery and the presentation of evidence. While more evidence may be presented in a Continental style
trial than in an adversary one (though even here I would like to see
empirical data), I doubt whether parties in continental civil trials secure more information than parties in the United States secure
through investigation and discovery. If less information is presented
in trials here than on the Continent, it may only be because knowing
the most relevant information at the outset allows parties to pick and
choose what they want to present. In trials at intervals, parties do not
know what new information will emerge in the weeks between hearings, and so they may present evidence at an early stage which is less
persuasive than later discovered information or redundant.
For me a good book is one which in exposing me to new perspectives stimulates my own thinking. By this measure Professor
Damaska has written a very good book indeed. In this essay I do not
claim that Professor Damaska has gotten anything wrong. Rather, I
have pointed to matters on which I think there is more to be said.
There is no one better equipped than Professor Damaska to address
these issues. Like any true fan, I await his next book.

